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MINNESOTA
O'Brien v. Card, No. C3-02-860, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 282 (Minn.
Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2003) (holding permission to use riparian rights on a
lake may defeat a claim of trespass since the riparian rights allow access
to other properties on the lake).
Thomas O'Brien ("O'Brien") brought an action in the Le Sueur
County District Court against Larry Card, Thomas Card, and James
Card ("Cards") for common law and statutory trespass on his land.
The district court found in favor of the Cards. O'Brien appealed to
the Court of Appeals of Minnesota which affirmed the district court's
determination.
O'Brien owned a tract of land that he claimed contained three
basins of water that comprised Mud Lake. William Strangler and Mark
Pettis owned land adjacent to O'Brien's land, and they granted
permission to the Cards to enter their properties to hunt. Strangler
and Pettis contended that Mud Lake was one basin of water, and that
as riparian owners, they, or their invitees, had access to the entire
basin. The Cards conceded that they hunted on portions of Mud Lake
that were within the boundaries of O'Brien's property, but they
asserted the affirmative defense that Mud Lake was public water and
that they traveled on the Strangler and Pettis properties to the shore of
the lake and used a boat to hunt. O'Brien claimed that he acquired
Strangler's riparian rights through quitclaim deeds, and that Mud
Lake was so low that no access to the water from the Strangler and
Pettis properties existed except through a ditch on his own property.
The district court found that: (1) Mud Lake was one basin; (2)
Pettis' and Strangler's properties bordered Mud Lake; (3) there was
riparian access to the lake from these properties; (4) Strangler did not
lose his riparian rights to Mud Lake by the exchange of deeds; and (5)
as the holders of riparian rights, Strangler, Pettis, and the Cards, as
their invitees, had the right to use the surface waters of Mud Lake.
The appellate court determined that for O'Brien to prove
common law trespass he had to demonstrate a rightful possession in
himself, and unlawful entry upon such possession by the Cards. The
court reviewed the record in the light most favorable to the judgment
of the district court, and did not reconcile the conflicting evidence as
to the levels of Mud Lake when the Cards traveled upon it. Also, the
court did not determine whether the ditch provided legal access to the
lake since the district court did not address the issue. The court noted
that there were additional ways to reach the water on O'Brien's
property other than the ditch.
In addition, the court declined to address the issue of statutory
trespass since the statute and its elements were not fully discussed at
the district court trial. Further, the court determined that the deed
from O'Brien to Strangler reserved Strangler's riparian rights west of
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the boundary line and did not extinguish them. Lastly, the court
affirmed O'Brien's motion to strike part of the Card's appendix, a
color-coded map, since it was never filed with the district court as an
exhibit.
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MONTANA
Graveley Sirmnental Ranch Co. v. Quigley, 65 P.3d 225 (Mont. 2003)
(finding that reasonable limitations pertaining to ditch maintenance
on easements are appropriate and joint liability for such ditch repair is
proper).
Graveley Simmental Ranch Co., Clifford E. Graveley, McIntosh
Ranch, and William McIntosh ("Graveley") owned and maintained a
ditch ("Graveley Ditch") that carried water from Ophir Creek to their
property in Powell County, Montana. James C. Quigley ("Quigley")
owned and maintained a separate ditch ("Quigley Ditch") that
transported water from Ophir Creek. Quigley's ditch ran across
Graveley's land pursuant to a secondary easement, and followed the
same course as the Graveley Ditch. Over the past several years,
Graveley unsuccessfully contested Quigley's ownership rights to the
Quigley Ditch, and sought numerous judicial decrees to limit Quigley's
ditch flow right and ditch size due to a breach and subsequent washout
in 1948 caused by the Quigley Ditch carrying too much water. On May
23, 1995, the Quigley Ditch broke again, causing a washout that
destroyed the Graveley Ditch and damaged Graveley's property. This
landslide prompted the initial lawsuit filed by Graveley against Quigley
in the Third Judicial District Court in Powell County. The district
court limited Quigley's ditch right to 800 miner's inches, limited
Quigley's easement rights pertaining to Graveley's property, assigned
joint liability to the parties for the 1995 washout, ordered Quigley to
pay Graveley's attorneys fees, and refused to grant Quigley a new trial
regarding a previous injunction temporarily limiting Quigley's ditch
flow to 400 miner's inches. Both parties appealed the district court's
judgment.
The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the lower court's
limitation of Quigley's ditch flow right according to the applicable
standard of review, which required the court to affirm the ruling
absent a determination that it was clearly erroneous. The court
reviewed all previous disputes between Quigley and Graveley regarding
Quigley's ditch flow right, and found that, in almost all judicial orders,
the courts decreed the ditch as having a carrying capacity of 800
miner's inches. Since the district court's ruling was not clearly
erroneous, the court affirmed the ruling on this issue.

